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M A R K E T -M A K IN G  AND DECEN TRA LIZED  TRA D E
Nick VRIEND
European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Abstract:
A model of a decentralized economy is presented. The basic features of decentralized trade 
taken into account are, that agents have a limited knowledge of their economic 
environment, that such knowledge requires some kind of communication or interaction 
between agents, and that agents face uncertainty as to their immediate trading 
opportunities. The paper stresses the importance of an explicit consideration of the 
communication and trading structure in models of decentralized trade. We consider trade 
in a homogeneous commodity. Besides deciding upon their effective demands, agents may 
create their own markets by spreading information about themselves. The market structure 
in a Symmetric Nash Equilibrium is characterized as follows. The economy splits up in a 
number of possibly overlapping, imperfectly competitive markets. These markets are all 
made by sellers, as buyers won’t engage in such activity. Both suppliers and demanders 
may be rationed at the same time, i.e. markets are not orderly.
* I would like to thank P. Dehez and A. Kirman for their continuous help with this paper. 
P. Hammond and A. Leijonhufvud commented upon a very preliminary draft, V. Brousseau 
supplied some mathematical assistance. All remaining errors are mine. A previous version 
of this paper has been presented at the Fifth Annual Congress of the European Economic 























































































































































































One of the main tasks of economic theory is to explain the outcomes of a 
decentralized economy. The best developed models which address this problem are 
the Walrasian general equilibrium models. These models start with a set of separate 
individuals, each characterized by preferences, technologies and endowments (the 
so-called primitives of the economy). To explain both the actions of the individuals 
and the outcomes of these actions resort is taken to a number of concepts and rules 
which imply a very specific trading and communication structure. One of the 
distinguishing characteristics of this is that all trade and communication take place 
centrally through The Market, which is a public good kindly provided by the 
auctioneer. This structure may well be represented by a graph in which nodes denote 
individual agents and arcs communication between these agents (see e.g. Kirman 
[1983]).




























































































With respect to information the Walrasian trading structure is very efficient.1 There 
are only information signals needed directed to or from the auctioneer, and the only 
information the auctioneer needs in order to evaluate the incoming signals 
(individual demands) and to calculate outgoing signals (prices) is the aggregate 
demand on each market.2
This efficiency is probably the main reason of attraction to the Walrasian structure. 
Unfortunately, this structure is at the same time also highly unrealistic and 
restrictive.
Without the auctioneer and the communication lines connecting the auctioneer with 
the individual agents, the auctioneer’s functions are no longer fulfilled. There is no 
tâtonnement process, there is nobody to announce relevant information centrally, and 
nobody is taking care of an orderly, frictionless clearing of the markets. Trade is no 
longer centralized and individual agents have to take care themselves of their trades. 
In general, minimum requirements for trade being feasible are that, first, two or 
more agents meet of which one is a seller and another a buyer, and second, they 
agree upon the rate of exchange and the quantities to exchange. Therefore, to start 
with, one has to specify how agents enter in contact with each other. That is, having 
lost the Walrasian ‘star’, one needs an alternative story of how markets are organized 
in a decentralized economy (see Fisher [1989] or Gould [1980]).
We will study this problem for a decentralized economy which is characterized by 
the following basic properties:
(i) There is a large number of agents and a large number of different commodities, 




























































































(ii) Each agent is interested in only a small number of commodities, while the 
fraction of agents interested in a commodity is small for each commodity (cf. Fisher 
[1983]).
(iii) The economy is not a priori organized by an auctioneer, intermediary, 
specialized trader, central distributor, or anonymous random matching mechanism 
(e.g. Gale [1985]), but instead the economy to consider is one with decentralized 
trade which depends upon the decisions of individual agents who act on a stricdy 
do-it-yourself basis.
(iv) Agents, although knowing about the existence of other agents, have no 
pre-communication knowledge of each other’s individual characteristics like e.g. 
effective demands (let alone endowments and preferences).
(v) As long as an agent doesn’t have any information about the characteristics of any 
other agent, he is not able to find a trading partner.
(vi) Individual agents may communicate with each other.
(vii) Communication is costly.
Thus, just like in the Walrasian models, we start with a set of individual agents with 
given characteristics. After all, that is what economic theory is about: rational and 
self-seeking individual agents (see Hahn [1983]). Basically, the assumed properties 
of a decentralized economy imply that there is an information problem and that this 
problem has to be solved, in one way or another, by the individual agents in order 
for trade to be possible. All trade involves transaction costs. These transaction costs 
are the costs of sending or gathering information about potential trading possibilities. 
Without such information no trade is possible. A key characteristic is (v). That 
characteristic may be explained by reasoning that expected costs of uninformed 




























































































‘psychological’ costs (disutility) of accosting a randomly chosen agent to bother him 
with a question like “Could you please sell me a refrigerator?” are high, while the 
probability that such an agent will indeed be interested in such a transaction is low. 
Although this is related to the other characteristics, it is convenient to assume it 
directly.3 Thus, by communication with other agents an individual agent creates the 
possibility to meet potential trading partners. In general, when there are possibilities 
to trade in a certain commodity, it is said that a market for that commodity exists. 
Hence, by establishing communication with other agents, individual agents create in 
a certain sense their own markets. In this view a market is not a central place where 
a certain good is exchanged, nor is it simply the aggregate supply and demand of a 
good. A market is constituted by communication between individual agents. As Blin 
[1980] puts it:
«Markets rarely emerge in a vacuum, and potential traders soon discover that they 
may spend more time, energy, and other resources discovering or “making" a 
market than on the trade itself. This predicament is shared equally by currency 
traders, do-it-yourself realtors, and streetwalkers! Their dilemma, however, seems 
to have gone largely unnoticed by economists, who simply assume that somehow 
traders will eventually be apprised of each other’s existence - to their mutual benefit 
or subsequent regret.» (p. S193)
Characteristic (iv) implies that an individual agent is not able to direct his 
communication towards a subset of agents with some specific characteristics. Hence, 
although an individual agent may very well choose the agents with whom to 
communicate in a deterministic manner, we may consider the choice of agents with 
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fig. 1.2 non-Walrasian structure
In the sketched framework individual agents will face market uncertainty, i.e. they 
will be uncertain about their immediate trading possibilities. The presence of market 
uncertainty has two causes. First, the tâtonnement process, which precluded market 
uncertainty as the auctioneer signaled the individually relevant information to each 
agent before trade might take place, has been abolished. Second, the contents of the 
relevant, i.e. individually needed, information has changed due to the changed 
structure of trade. Individually relevant information would be complete when each
agent knew the current price vector, the complete vector of effective demands of all 
other agents, and where and when to meet these agents.
This market uncertainty is endogenous uncertainty in two senses. First, it is inherent 




























































































complete, as additional markets for insurance or hedge transactions would face the 
same kind of market uncertainty problems (see Foley & Hellwig [1975] or Dehez 
[1980]). Secondly, the level of market uncertainty is in a certain sense endogenous. 
The agents’ state of information about their transaction possibilities depends upon 
the amount of communication in the economy. All communication is between 
individual agents, and its amount just depends upon how much information costs 
these individual agents decide to incur.
To stress the importance of the presence of market uncertainty further, the basic 
framework will also have the following characteristics.
(viii) There is no exogenous uncertainty, i.e. there is no ‘state-of-nature’ uncertainty. 
In this respect markets are complete.
(ix) Individual agents know the aggregate state of the economy (e.g. aggregate 
demands, total numbers of sellers/buyers).
(x) All commodities are known by all agents (cf. Gary-Bobo & Lesne [1988]).
(xi) There is no quality uncertainty (cf. Spence [1974]).
(xii) The transaction costs mentioned are information costs and there isn’t any kind 
of real transaction costs (see Shubik [1975]).
A methodological account of the choice of the assumed characteristics of the basic 
framework may be useful. Contrary to some other contributions in a non-Walrasian 
perspective, the key to the selection of assumptions is not to find those which will 
guarantee that certain ‘Walrasian’ efficiency properties will hold.5 Instead, the idea 
is to focus on usefulness of assumptions in order to understand and analyze the 
apparent presence of information and coordination problems in decentralized 




























































































“recoverability” (Varian [1984]), i.e. the search for a list of restrictive assumptions 
with which certain observed phenomena could be explained as the result of 
optimizing behavior.
In section 2 we will make these general assumptions concrete and specify more 
precisely how individual agents may create their markets. In section 3 we will derive 
an equilibrium market structure from the optimizing behavior of individual agents, 
and analyze its characteristics. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Agents and Commodities
Assuming time to be divided into an infinite sequence of discrete periods indexed 
T, T 6 {1, 2, ...}, we consider an economy with a single homogeneous, perishable 
commodity in one period. A set A of N agents, each characterized by preferences, 
technologies and endowments, is divided into two disjoint classes (see e.g. Gale 
[1985]): a set B  of m firms and a set D of N-m consumers. Thus, IS = m, IDI = 
N-m, BhD - 0, BuD = A and IAI = N. We assume that N is large.
Given the agents’ preferences, technologies and endowments, any given consumer 
i can be characterized by a threshold price p,. This threshold price p, corresponds to 
the utility U, this agent would derive from his consumption of one unit of the 




























































































unit of the commodity (see e.g. Gale [1985] or Kormendi [1979]). Formally p, is 
defined by:
11,(0, to,) = U,(l, co-p,), [2.1]
where the first argument of the utility function concerns the commodity of our 
consideration and the second represents a basket of other goods or ‘income’. We 
assume that the threshold price is 0 for all consumers with respect to any further unit 
of the commodity. Formally:
11,(1, corp,) = U,(a, co,-p,) V  a>l V  i [2.2]
Thus, the number n of interested consumers depends upon the price p, and aggregate 
demand may be written n(p), which we assume to be objectively known by all 
sellers. In other words, given the characteristics of the individual agents, for each 
price p the set D of consumers consists of n(p) potential buyers and N-m-n(p) 
agents not interested at all in the commodity.
The m firms produce and sell the commodity. They are assumed to be identical in 
that they face the same technology. The cost C of producing z units of output is 
given by the function C(z), where z is a discrete variable (z > 0). We assume C(0) 
> 0 and AC(z)/Az > 0 for all z > 0, for all Az > 0. Production decided upon at the 
beginning of the period is immediately available for sale, while unsold stocks perish 
at the end.
In order for trade to take place, firms and consumers must meet, and they must agree 
upon the terms of trade. We assume that the price p of the commodity is given and 
equal for all agents, and that it is known to all agents. This assumption is made in 
order to stress the logical distinction between trading uncertainty and price 




























































































whether or not an agent will be able to trade what he wants at the going price (see 
Hahn [1980]).
Agents know that other agents exist, but they do not know any of the characteristics 
of these agents. In particular, they do not know which agent belongs to which class. 
Meeting potential trading partners, i.e. agents of the right class, is unfeasible if no 
agent has any information in this respect. Thus, we have to specify the way in which 
agents communicate with each other, by which they create their own markets.
2.2 Communication
Suppose for the moment that only the sellers may send information. This seems 
without doubt restrictive, although it conforms to what we usually observe in reality, 
but in section 3.4 we will show that it is not. Each seller may send information 
signals to some other agents at the beginning of the period, each signal being 
directed to one agent. A signal contains, first, the ‘name and address’ of the sending 
agent, and secondly, the fact that he belongs to the class of firms B. Thus, signals 
reveal the type of a given agent, like, for example “Mr. A, 22 Oxfordstreet sells 
refrigerators”.6
The rationale for signaling should be clear: the signals are the only means of direct 
communication between individual agents. Agents who perceive no signals and are 
sending no signals can’t find a trading partner.
We assume that signaling is costly, the cost being an increasing function of the 
amount of signals sent. The cost K of sending s signals is given by the function K(s) 




























































































technology we assume that it always costs k to send one additional signal, while 
K(0) = 0. Receiving signals, on the other hand, is costless.
2.3 Trade
Agents make their decisions concerning communication and effective demand at the 
beginning of each period (see next section). During each period they try to buy or 
sell in their markets. We assume that the trading possibilities for each agent are 
dependent only upon the communication and demands in the given period. Thus, 
sellers have no reputation and there are no customer relations. Moreover, demand 
above the firm’s available supply is simply forgone and cannot be backlogged.
with f =  firm
c =  interested co n su m e r  
x =  not interested consumer




























































































When the firms have sent their signals the economy might look like figure 2.1. In 
this example firm 3’s market comprises consumers 2 and N, while consumer N’s 
market consists of firms 1 and 3, etc.
We assume that each consumer who has received one or more signals may visit one 
firm (‘shopping’). The order in which buyers make their visit is random.7 When a 
firm is sold out customers will turn home unsatisfied, otherwise they may buy one 
unit. Thus, trade in our model is bilateral.8
3. Strategies and Equilibrium
3.1 Objectives and Strategies
A consumer’s utility would increase in the current period if he could buy one unit 
of the commodity at a price below his threshold price p. If a consumer receives one 
or more signals at the beginning of the period, and if the price is indeed below his 
threshold price p, then he randomly chooses among these signals a firm to visit.9 
If this firm is sold out the consumer will be left unsatisfied in this period, otherwise 
he will buy one unit.10
Firm i’s objective is to maximize its expected current profit V, , which is equal to 
its expected gross revenue R, minus its production cost C(z,) minus its 
market-making cost K(S;), by deciding upon its effective supply z, and signaling S;. 
Moreover, it has to decide to which agents it sends these signals. We assume that 




























































































a pair (Zj, s,). The costs are dependent only upon firm i’s own strategy, but the 
revenue of its market-making and production activity, i.e. firm i’s actual sales (p-Xj, 
to be defined later), are a function of the vector t of the strategies of all firms 
(including firm i itself). (Vectors are denoted by bold-face letters. An overview of 
the notation can be found in appendix E.) Thus, firm i’s objective function is: 
V^t) = R,(t) -  C(Zi) -  K(s,), [3.1]
where R,(t) = p-X;(t)
We now give two definitions and present the objective of this part of the paper.
Definition 3.1: A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a vector of strategies t ' = (tj, .., t*, .., 
O  such that, for each i, firm i maximizes its payoff V, by choosing strategy t* given 
the strategies of the other firms t_, = t’, , i.e. Vj(t‘, t*,) > Vi(ti, t*,) V  i V  t, .
Definition 3.2: A Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE) is a NE t* such that t‘ = t*
V  i  V  j.
We restrict our attention to the existence and characterization of a SNE. Given the 
assumed non-Walrasian trading structure and the assumptions about the primitives 
of the economy, we will show for which parameter values such a SNE exists.
The question to answer concerning existence of a SNE is: Does a strategy t’ exist 
such that if all other firms choose t* it is optimal for firm i also to choose t* ? In 
order to consider the optimization problem of firm i in section 3.3, we first make 
explicit how firm i’s trading opportunities, and hence its payoff V ;, depend upon the 




























































































3.2 Stochastic Trading Opportunities
Firm i’s expected gross revenue is equal to its expected sales: Rj(t) = p-x,(t). Given 
the assumptions made in the previous sections about the nature of the commodity 
and the trading structure, it is clear that firm i can’t sell more than is demanded by 
its customers (q,(s)) or than it has produced at the beginning of the period (z,). That 
is, x,(t) = min{qi(s), z j . Therefore, we have to specify the demand directed towards 
firm i q/s).
Proposition 3.1: The demand directed towards firm i q(s) is a random variable 
which may be represented by a Poisson distribution with parameter 
m = p(Sj, S_j) = (s/S) • n(p) • (1 -  e_s/N), where S_, denotes the aggregate number 
of signals sent by the other firms and S = s; + S_s .
Proof: The complete proof can be found in appendix A. Here we give a sketch. Firm 
i sends s* signals at random into the population. Each signal may result in a 
consumer, who wants to buy one unit, visiting firm i or may remain without any 
reaction. This depends upon the probability that the receiver of such a signal is an 
interested consumer and the probability that he will choose the signal from firm i 
among the signals he receives. The latter, clearly, also depends upon the aggregate 
signaling activity of the other firms. It turns out that the probability that any given 
signal sent by firm i will lead to a consumer visiting firm i is:
Pr(S) = (n(p)/S) • (1 -  e~s/N). Firm i sends s, signals, and the number of buyers 
visiting firm i may be approximated by a Poisson distribution with parameter 




























































































This result can be interpreted straightforwardly. The potential aggregate demand in 
the economy, given the price p, is n.12 The probability that any given potential 
consumer won’t receive any signal at all, and thus will not find his way to a market 
is e-S/N. Hence, aggregate market demand is n (1 -  e_s/N). Finally, each firm’s 
expected market share turns out to be equal to his share in the aggregate market­
making activity (Sj/S).
Note that the probability of any given signal from firm i having success is a function 
only of the aggregate number of signals S sent by all firms. Hence, Pr,(S) = Pr(S) 
for all i. This is because each interested consumer handles all his received signals 
identically, putting them all in an urn and drawing just one signal. Notice also that 
Pi turns out to be a function only of the number of signals sent by firm i itself (s,) 
and the aggregate number of signals sent by all other firms (S_;). Thus, the vector 
of strategies chosen by the other firms t_, enters firm i’s decision problem only 
through the aggregate market-making signaling activity.13
The resulting transaction possibilities for any given agent are stochastic. Thus, agents 
are uncertain as to whether they will be able to trade as much as they want. There 
are, as we have seen, two direct causes for this uncertainty. First, communication is 
stochastic, i.e. signals are randomly distributed because agents don’t know each 
other’s characteristics. Second, given that an agent has found or established a market, 
he or his potential trading partners may have fulfilled already their demand before 
they happen to meet, i.e. shopping is a stochastic process.
The trading possibilities for firm i are derived explicitly from assumptions about the 
underlying communication and trading structure of the economy, instead of assuming 




























































































demand for firm i’s output depends upon one of the (non-price) decision variables 
of the firm itself. This stochastic demand is not generated by sending an effective 
demand (i.e. supply) to the market, but by creating the market itself.14
As a result, firm i’s gross revenue may be written: [3.2]
Ri(z„ Si, S_i) = p ■ {Xqz=0 q, • f[qil li(s„ S_j)] + z, • X;=2 f[q,l H(s,, S.,)]}, 
where f[qlpj denotes the p.d.f. of q with parameter (i.
Observe that the stochastic trading mechanism has an anonymity property built in. 
That is, agents who have the same effective demand and have sent out the same 
number of signals can expect the same realizations. This is due to the fact that 
trading possibilities only depend upon current period variables, that all signals are 
for each firm independently distributed, each agent being equally likely to receive 
such signals, that the firms to visit are chosen independently by all buyers, each firm 
being equally likely to be chosen among the firms in the buyer’s market, and that 
the order in which buyers make their visits is determined randomly and does not 
depend upon the agents themselves.
We further characterize the stochastic demand directed to firm i through the 
following claims.
Claim 3.1 a: For given S_|, p(s,, S_,) is a one-to-one function of S;, with
11(0, S_j) = 0 ,
0 < Ap(s„ S_,)/As, -  Pr(S) < 1 ,
A2|i(Sj, S_j)/As2 < 0 , and 





























































































b: For given s, , p(s,, S_,) is a one-to-one function of S_;, with 
An(Si, S_,)/AS_, < 0 , and 
lim M-fSj, S_i) = 0
S_j—fOO
Proof: See appendix A.
Thus, a firm which doesn’t signal doesn’t get any demand. The expected change in 
the demand directed to firm i as a result of sending one additional signal is positive 
but less than 1, and it depends only upon the aggregate signaling activity in the 
economy. Notice that for given S this is equal for all firms, and that it does not 
matter which firm sends how much signals, and in particular it doesn’t matter how 
much of the S signals are sent by firm i itself. A firm may eventually capture the 
whole aggregate demand by signaling more and more, given the strategies of the 
other firms. However, the more other firms signal, the less will be firm i’s expected 
demand.
Suppose all m firms send the same number of signals: s( = s for all i, S = m s, and
pCs,, S_.) becomes p.(s) = p(s, (m -l)s).
Claim 3.2: |2(s) is a one-to-one function of s, with 
WO) = o ,
0 < AWs)/As < 1 ,
A2Ws)/As2 < 0 , and 
lim p.(s) = n/m




























































































Thus, if all firms send an infinite number of signals they may expect to share equally 
the whole aggregate demand. Note that for m=l we describe the case of a 
monopolist.
The claims of this section are illustrated in figure 3.1.
3.3 Optimization and Equilibrium
Now we are in the position to consider firm i’s optimization problem. As a strategy 
t, for firm i is a pair (Zj, s,) the first-order conditions (FOCs) for maximization of 




























































































AVj(z,, S_i)/ASi = ARi(Zi, sh S_i)/ASi -  AK(Si)/ASi = 0 [3.2]
AVi(Zi, Sj, S_i)/AZi = ARi(zi; Sj, S_i)/AZi -  A C ^/A ^ = 0
Claim 3.3 a: AR,/As, = p • F[zr l] • Pr(S) , where F[z] denotes S ,=0 f[q] 
b: AR/AZi = p • (1 -  F[zJ)
Proof. See appendix B.
In other words, the gross revenue for firm i of sending one additional signal, given 
the strategies of the other firms, is the price p multiplied by the probability that firm 
i would have had still at least one unit of the commodity available multiplied by the 
probability that this additional signal will lead to a consumer visiting firm i. And the 
gross revenue for firm i of supplying one additional unit of the commodity, given 
the strategies of the other firms, is the price p multiplied by the probability that it 
would have sold out otherwise.
It is advantageous for firm i to increase its signaling s* with one unit as long as 
AR/Asj > AK/As, = k. Similarly, it is advantageous for firm i to increase its supply 
z, with one unit as long as AR,/Az, > AC/Azr
We are interested only in a SNE. Therefore, having derived the FOCs for 
maximization of firm i’s payoff, we evaluate these conditions only for those cases 
in which each firm chooses the same strategy. Hence, z, = z and s, = s for all i, S 
= m s, and by FOC+ we denote a first-order-plus-symmetry condition.
Claim 3.4 a: For every value of z there exists exactly one value of s, denoted by 




























































































0, As(z)/Az > 0, lim s(z) = s”“ = {s: ARj(z=~, s)/As, = k}, and s(z) > z for all z as
Z—►©o
long as s(z) < sm“ . Moreover, sm“ > 0 if and only if n/N > k/p.
b: For every value of s there exists exactly one value of z, denoted by z(s), for 
which the second FOC+ is satisfied. This function is characterized by z(0) = 0, 
Az(s)/As > 0, lim z(s) = zm“  = (z: AR;(z, s=°°)/Az = AC/Az), and z(s) < s for each
S—f° °
s. Moreover, if A2C/Az2 > 0 for all z then z"1"  > 0 if and only if 
n/m > —In{1 -  {AC(0)/Az}/p}.16
Proof: See appendix B.
In figure 3.2 both curves are drawn. Clearly, if a firm does not produce it doesn’t 
signal either, and the other way round. Moreover, there is a maximum level of 
signaling, which is related to the fact that beyond that level it is very unlikely that 
the receiver of an additional signal will respond to that signal. Thus, whatever the 
level of production the expected gains from an additional signal are below its costs. 
Similarly, there is a maximum level of production, which is related to the fact that 
it is very improbable that there will ever come a customer to buy it, whatever the 
level of signaling.
At a point of intersection of the two curves both FOCs for maximization of firm i’s 
payoff are fulfilled, while each firm chooses the same strategy t. Thus, such a point 




























































































fig. 3.2 first-order-plus-symmetry condition
Now, we turn to the second-order condition (SOC) for t to be a SNE strategy: 
A2Vi(z,, s„ S_j)/Azf ■ A2Vl(zi, Si, S_,)/As2 -  {A{AV,(z„ si( S.^/AsJ/AzJ2 > 0 
and AV^Zj, s,, S_,)/As2 < 0
The following claim gives a sufficient condition for this to be satisfied, given a 
strategy t at which the FOC+s are fulfilled.
Claim 3.5: If {A2C(z)/Az2}/p > f[z+l]/z then the SOC is fulfilled.
Proof: See appendix B.




























































































Proof: This follows directly from the fact that p > 0, f[z+l] > 0 and z > 0. □
Thus, a necessary condition concerning the production technology is that there are 
decreasing returns to scale (at least locally). The economic meaning of the sign of 
the second derivative of the cost function is clear, but, a priori, it doesn’t seem to 
make much sense to make further assumptions concerning the shape of the C(z) 
function, i.e. with respect to the third derivative. Note that whether the SOC will 
actually be fulfilled depends also upon the strategy t for which the FOC’s are 
fulfilled.
Suppose that there were no market uncertainty. That is, when firm i supplied z units 
it would know that it would sell z units: f[z] = 1. Then, f[z+l] = 0, and the 
condition of claim 3.5 would be A2C(z)/Az2 > 0, which is a rather familiar expression 
for models without market uncertainty.
Finally, one has to consider the payoff V-, to firm i. Clearly, if the expected profit 
when all firms choose strategy t is negative, firm i will prefer to stay inactive, and 
no strictly positive SNE exists.
Proposition 3.2: Necessary, but not sufficient, conditions concerning the parameter 
values for a SNE to exist are: 
n/N > k/p ,
n/m > —In{1 -  {AC(0)/Az)/p} , and 
A2C(z)/Az2 > 0




























































































These conditions imply that n, p and A2C(z)/Az2 must be large enough, while N, m, 
k and AC(0)/Az must be small enough, as would have been the intuition. However, 
the conditions are not sufficient. We have done a numerical analysis in order to 
determine the values of k, C(.), p, n(.), m and N for which a SNE exists. The details 
and results can be found in appendix D.
We can summarize the findings as follows. A SNE won’t exist when the costs of 
making a market and/or producing for the market are too high relative to the price 
p for each possible extent of the market at all levels of production. This may be due 
not only to the level of prices (p) and costs (k and AC/Az) as such, but also to a too 
small number of potential buyers (n) in the economy or a too large number of 
competing firms (m).
In the next section on comparative statics we give an analysis of the effects of 
changes in the parameter values.
3.4 Comparative Statics
We now consider more detailed the influence of parameter changes. This leads to 
the following series of claims. First, we concern the FOC+s, referring to the s(z) and 
z(s) curves of figure 3.2, and then the condition V>0. We assume that the necessary 
conditions of proposition 3.2 are fulfilled.
Claim 3.6 a: There is a number r, r > 0, such that for any k < r the FOC*s are 
fulfilled for some strategy t.
b: There is a number r, r > 0, such that for any AC(z)/Az < r for all z the 




























































































Proof. See appendix B.
The influence of the parameter p clearly depends upon the price-elasticity of 
demand e = -dn(p)/dp ■ p/n(p).
Claim 3.7 a: As(z)/Ap < 0 if {F[z-1] -  p • f[z-l]} > 0
and e > F[z- l]/{F[z-l] -  p • f[z-l]} 
while As(z)/Ap > 0 otherwise 
b: Az(s)/Ap > 0 if e < (1 -  F[z])/(p ■ f[z]) 
while Az(s)/Ap < 0 otherwise
Proof. See appendix B.
The effect of a change in p if aggregate demand n(p) would be insensitive to price 
changes is considered in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2: If e = 0 then there is a number r, r > 0, such that for p > r the FOCs 
are satisfied for some strategy t.
Proof: As long as p increases the s(z) curve in figure 3.2 shifts to the right and the 
z(s) curve upwards. Hence, at a certain point they must intersect. □
Claims 3.6 and 3.7 and the corollary concern the net gains per transaction. If these 
gains are not high enough, no markets will be created. However, each firm’s gains 
also depend upon its trading opportunities. The following claim considers the 




























































































Claim 3.8 a: As(z)/A(n/m) > 0 if {F[z-1] -  (J. • f[z—1]} > 0 
As(z)/A(n/m) < 0 otherwise 
b: Az(s)/A(n/m) > 0
Proof: See appendix B.
Thus, the direct effect of a change in the parameters m and those of n(.) is 
ambiguous. The problem is that there are two opposing effects upon the s(z) curve 
in figure 3.2. On the one hand, if the probability of success of any given signal 
(Pr(s)) increases, then the probability of success of an additional signal increases. 
However, on the other hand, also the probability of success of all other signals 
increases, implying that the firm may expect more visitors and the probability that 
the firm would have at least one unit of the commodity left (F[z-1]) decreases, and 
thus the probability that an additional visitor doesn’t make sense increases. However, 
at least, we know what happens when n/m approaches infinity.
Claim 3.9: If n/m— ><=0 then the FOC+s will be fulfilled for t = (z = {z: AC/Az = p -k ), 
s = z)
Proof: See appendix B.
Thus, when n/m goes to infinity, each signal sent will surely lead to a consumer 
visiting its sender, and hence a situation of certainty is approached.




























































































Claim 3.10 a: dV,/dk < 0 
b: dV/d(AC/Az) < 0
c: dV/dp > 0 if e < 1 + {z • (1 -  F[z])}/(p • F[z-1]) 
dVj/dp < 0 otherwise 
d: dV/d(n/m) > 0
Proof. See appendix B.
Thus, if the FOC+s and the condition V>0 were not fulfilled for a given set of 
parameters, they may be fulfilled form some k' < k, some (AC/Az)' < (AC/Az) for 
all z, some p' > p, or some (n/m)' > (n/m).
As long as one doesn’t further restrict the cost function C(z), it is not possible to say 
much about the effect of parameter changes upon the SOC. One can only observe 
that f[z+l] is bounded below 1, and that therefore the right-hand side of the equation 
of claim 3.5 approaches zero if z goes to infinity, implying that it might be more 
likely that the SOC is fulfilled when z is larger.
Corollary 3.3: if a SNE (z \ s‘, V*) exists for a given ‘set of parameters’ {k, C(.), 
p, N, n(.), m) then
a: if k decreases then z \  s* and V* increase 
b: if AC/Az is smaller for all z then z*, s* and V* increase 
c: if p increases and e = 0 then z", s* and V* increase 
d: if n(p)/m increases then V* increases, while the effect upon z and s’ may 




























































































Proof. See claims 3.6, 3.8 and 3.10, and corollary 3.2. □
Thus, higher net gains per transaction will, ceteris paribus, lead to a SNE with 
increased supply, increased market-making activity and increased profits. A decrease 
of market uncertainty will lead to higher profits, but not necessarily to increased 
signaling and production activity, as there is no unambiguous relation between the 
number of firms per interested consumer and the amount of market-making activity.
3.5 Some Characteristics o f the SNE
In a SNE the economy splits up in a number of possibly overlapping markets: each 
firm creates its own market of size s*, and produces z*. Supposing that a SNE exists, 
we now analyze its characteristics.
Sometimes a relation between the division of labor and the extent o f the market is 
suggested; the latter determining the first (Smith [1776]) or the other way round. 
Take the number of firms m, for given N, as a measure of the division of labor, and 
the aggregate number of signals S as a measure of the extent of the market.
Proposition 3.3: The extent of the market (S) is a function of the division of labor 
(m), and the sign of AS/Am is not a priori determined.
Proof: Given the set of parameters, individual firm choose z and s. S is just the 
aggregate market-making activity: S = m-s. Hence, AS/Am = s + m • As/Am. As 




























































































Thus, in this model the extent of the market is determined by the division of labor, 
but the consequence of a small change of the latter for the first is not clear.
Proposition 3.4: If the ‘set of parameters’ {k, C(.), p, N, n(.), m} leads to a SNE 
(z*, s', V*) then the ‘set of parameters’ {k, C(.), p, a-N, an(.), a m) leads to exactly 
the same SNE (z \ s', V') for any a > 0.
Proof: See appendix C.
In other words, the SNE and individual market outcomes are independent of the size 
of the economy as long as the proportions of types of agents, i.e. firms and 
(interested) consumers, remain constant.17 Hence, we could interpret the parameters 
of the model such that the number of agents N is countably infinite, while m and 
n(.) are the fractions of firms and interested consumers in the population.
Until here we just supposed that only firms may send signals. The following 
proposition states which assumption suffices to make that supposition right.
Proposition 3.5: Sufficient to get as an analytical result that consumers do not signal 
is to assume: m/N < k/{U,(l, £0-p) -  U,(0, w,)} for each consumer i.
Proof: Analogous to part of the proof of claim 3.4.
This proposition makes clear why, usually, consumers do not create buyers’ markets, 
even when the same market-making technology is available to them. Consumers are 
interested in buying only a very limited number of units, in our model only 1, while 




























































































is the fact that, in general, there are much more consumers (n) of a certain 
commodity than firms (m) selling that commodity, making it more difficult for 
consumers to find firms than the other way round.
To analyze markets one often uses the concepts of demand and supply functions. A 
supply function of a firm represents the firm’s willingness to supply as a function 
of the input and output prices, taking into account its production technology. It is a 
purely individual characteristic of the sellers, and is independent of the buyers 
willingness to buy (see e.g. Varian [1984]).
Proposition 3.6: In this non-Walrasian setting no relevant supply function exists. 
Proof. See appendix C.
The point is that, in this non-Walrasian setting, what is relevant is a firm’s effective 
supply z. This effective supply cannot be determined independently of the firm’s 
trading opportunities, i.e. of the stochastic demand directed to it. The expected value 
of this demand depends upon the aggregate demand in the economy n(p).
Now we consider the efficiency of the SNE. Clearly, the allocation mechanism as 
such is informationally inefficient. We focus upon efficiency given the trading and 
communication structure of the model (see Ulph & Ulph [1975]).
One of the attractive features of Walrasian models is that The Market is operated 
very efficiently. A market is efficient if all mutually advantageous trades are carried 




























































































at the same time (see Benassy [1982]). In this sense the market outcome of a SNE 
is inefficient.
Proposition 3.7: Prob [(x-z,) • (Xj-Zj) < 0] > 0 for each pair i, j where i e B, 
j e D and z > 0.
Proof: See appendix C. Here we give a sketch. Firm i’s supply is z \  while the 
stochastic demand directed to it is represented by f[q]. Thus, the probability that firm 
i is rationed is equal to the probability that it will receive less than z* buyers:
Prob [(Xj-Zj) > 0] = F[z‘-1] > 0.
An interested consumer j has a unit demand and may visit only one firm. Buyers 
will be rationed when they don’t receive any signal or when they visit a firm which 
has sold out already. In appendix C we see that both possibilities may occur with 
positive probabilities: Prob [(Xj-Zj) < 0] > 0. □
Thus, in a SNE the overall economy will not be orderly for each p as there may be 
some buyers as well as some firms rationed at the same time.18 19 This seems to 
be a rather important characteristic of a decentralized economy.
As rationing with respect to the consumers is all-or-nothing, from their point of view 
the probability to be rationed is a good measure of the performance of the economy. 
Firms, however, do take the market uncertainty already into account when deciding 
upon their effective supply, and rationing is a quite ‘natural’ affair for them. 
Therefore, we also consider another measure of efficiency concerning the firms. 
Until here we considered the non-cooperative equilibrium concept of a SNE. We can 




























































































Definition 3.3: A Symmetric Cooperative Equilibrium (SCE) is a vector of strategies 
tc = (t‘, tj, O  such that t‘ = t' for each i, j, and the sum of the payoffs of all 
firms is maximized by choosing strategy tc for each firm, i.e. L  V/T) > X V,(t) V 
t.
Proposition 3.8: The equilibrium strategy t* of a SNE involves more communication 
and production, but lower profits than the equilibrium strategy tc of a SCE, i.e. z* > 
zc and s* > sc , while V* < Vc.
Proof: See appendix C.
Thus, a SNE is not efficient from the firms’ point of view in the sense that a better, 
i.e. preferred by all firms, vector of strategies exists. However, each individual firm 
will have an incentive to deviate from the SCE strategy tc. Moreover, consumers are 
worse of in a SCE.
Proposition 3.9: Prob [cons, rationedl SNE] < Prob [cons, rationedl SCE]
Proof: See appendix C.
To conclude the characterization of the SNE, we give some numerical examples. In 
the first six rows of table 3.1 only the ‘parameters’ m and n vary. If we compare, 
for example, row 3 with row 6, we see that when the relative number of firms and 
consumers (n/m) doesn’t change the SNE remains the same. Interesting is also a 
comparison of row 4 with 5, where the number of firms (m) increases enormously. 




























































































Prob P rob P ro b
m n c k z* s* V ' [firm [cons. [neg.
rat.l rat.l p ro l i
5 5 ,000 .001 .010 6 57 22,053 220 .0 .33 .35 .00
100 5 ,000 .001 .010 61 4,641 1.1 .94 .01 .45
100 10,000 .001 .010 112 8 ,742 5.8 .87 .01 .26
10 37,500 .001 .010 9 6 7 3 ,196 470 .0 .03 .74 .00
7 50 37,500 .001 .010 61 4 ,640 1.6 .93 .00 .42
7 50 75,000 .001 .010 112 8 ,740 5.8 .87 .01 .26
100 10,000 .010 .050 34 3 89 5.7 .60 .69 .12
100 10,000 .001 .050 85 1,323 3.3 .90 .27 .33
100 10,000 .010 .010 76 1,762 29.0 .21 .25 .00
100 10,000 .001 .010 112 8 ,742 5.8 .87 .01 .26
100 10,000 .010 .005 84 2,754 35.0 .15 .17 .00
100 10,000 .001 .005 112 17,480 5.8 .87 .01 .26
Table 3.1 some examples
decrease but even increases, while its supply and profit fall dramatically. As the last 
three columns show, the economic situation changes from highly favorable for the 
firms to highly advantageous for the consumers.
In the last six rows the parameters c and k vary. Notice that the probability of a firm 






























































































4.1 Further Possibilities of the Framework
The basic features of a decentralized economy taken into account in our model are, 
that the behavior of individual agents is based upon some knowledge about possible 
transaction opportunities, that agents have a very limited knowledge of their 
economic environment, that such knowledge requires some kind of communication 
or interaction between agents, and that agents face uncertainty as to their immediate 
trading opportunities. A number of problems concerning decentralized trade is related 
to these features, and may therefore very well be studied within this framework.
For example, one could analyze the existence of central markets. Suppose that firms 
may decide to ‘cooperate’ physically in the market-making process. Instead of each 
firm selling its production in its own market, there may be one or more common, 
central markets or central distribution points. Suppose that the technology of 
market-making is still the same (the central distributors sending signals giving the 
address of the distributor and the message that he sells the commodity), and that 
there are no additional costs of running a central market. When we assume that each 
firm may sell in a common market proportionally to its contribution in the 
market-making costs, one could, for example, consider the non-cooperative solution 
concept of a Nash equilibrium. Each firm chooses a market to join and decides how 
much to contribute to the signaling activity, taking the choices of the other firms as 
given. This seems to capture the essential function of a central distributor. Notice 




























































































which reminds somewhat the situation sketched in figure 1.1 concerning a Walrasian 
model.
Also the functioning of middlemen may be very well analyzed within the framework 
of our model. Middlemen are not intrinsically interested in the commodity itself, i.e. 
they belong neither to the firms nor to the consumers. They buy from firms sellers 
and sell to buyers. This description still leaves room for a number of functions of 
middlemen (e.g. reducing real transaction costs, reducing storing costs, forming a 
buffer between fluctuating demand and supply, speculation, etc.), but the 
distinguishing characteristic of middlemen is that they make a profit by taking 
account of the matching problem of the economy. Thus, they create markets by 
sending signals to get contact with both firms and consumers.
The model seems to be an interesting starting-point to study price-making in a 
decentralized economy. The resulting market structure in a SNE is imperfectly 
competitive, although the commodity traded is homogeneous. Each firm signals to 
s agents, by which it creates its own market. Thus, buyers may know that a firm 
finds as a maximum s alternative buyers in the market, and therefore buyers have 
some monopsony power. Each buyer on the other hand, can only trade with those 
firms of which he received a signal. Thus, each firm may know that a buyer visiting 
him will know only a limited number of alternative firms to visit, and therefore they 
will have some monopoly power. In order to study price-making, some of the 
simplifying assumptions should be relaxed, but then the analysis becomes quite 
complicated (see e.g. Kormendi [1979]). Suppose e.g. that buyers may make more 
visits, knowing the distribution of prices at the beginning of the period, but not 
knowing which firm asks which price. In their search decision buyers do not only 




























































































the probability to find a lower price (as they do in standard search models), but they 
also have to take into account the probability that they won’t be able to find the 
commodity for an acceptable price at all in this period if they search too long. 
Moreover, during the search process there is uncertain recall (visited firms may sell 
out), while the distribution of prices may be changing (probably cheaper firms sell 
out more easily).
Finally, the model of decentralized trade proposed might be useful for a study of the 
phenomenon of liquidity, an asset being more liquid if it may be sold cheaper and 
more surely (see Hahn [1988]), or problems like effective demand failures: an agent 
not willing to demand/supply more of one commodity because of uncertainty about 
his trading possibilities concerning another commodity (see Grandmont [1988]).
4.2 Discussion
Clearly, we have made a number of abstractions from reality in this model. For 
example, most real world commodities are not homogeneous. But homogeneity and 
the lack of uncertainty about qualitative aspects may be defended as an abstraction 
in order to focus upon other aspects of decentralized trade.
Next, the information transmission mechanism might be too specific. For example, 
agents may hear from friends about the newest shops in town, buyers may use the 
Yellow Pages to find a seller, or they may randomly visit shops, etc. However, 
basically, these possibilities seem to fit rather well in the signaling framework used. 
In the first case, one could consider these friends as sending signals or one could 




























































































of his. Concerning the second case, one may consider a decision to be inserted in 
the list of the Yellow Pages as sending some signals. And about the last case, 
randomly visiting shops implies that these sellers have signaled already that they sell 
a certain commodity by having furnished a shopwindow etc. Thus, signaling consists 
of all the possible ways in which an agent may make information about his own type 
known to some other agents and is not restricted to e.g. advertising in a strict sense.
More important is the lack of any relation between information and market 
experiences of different periods. This implies that the model fits best to those 
commodities which are purchased rather infrequently. Examples of such commodities 
can be found in the retailing of consumer durables, the transportation sector (e.g. 
airline tickets), or the industry of leisure and entertainment (e.g. hotels, restaurants, 
theaters).
However, a lot of commodities are bought on a repeated basis, and it is not realistic 
to assume that agents start from scratch in each period. In a dynamic model agents 
will remember some information about their economic environment from previous 
periods (even when they have a bounded memory). Moreover, agents’ own market 
experience in the past will carry some weight when making new decisions. Thus, for 
example, firms may try to target their signals to interested consumers. And 
consumers will not choose a firm at random, as these firms will build up a 
reputation. Rather, consumers might opt for patronizing a certain firm as long as 
their market experiences with that firm are positive enough.
Hence, while in our model the number of information and trading links between 
agents is endogenous, in a dynamic model also the choice of the specific links 
should be made endogenous. Moreover, although we focussed upon the limited 




























































































firms did have objective knowledge about the aggregate demand and the aggregate 
signaling activity. In a dynamic model this should be replaced by their subjective 
perception based upon their own experiences.
One of the interesting features of the SNE described that would come into its own 
only in a dynamic model, is that even when ex-ante, expected market experiences 
are equal for all agents of the same class, actual market experiences may differ 
widely among agents. Take, for example, the payoff V to the firms. Clearly, if V; 
< 0, i.e. expected profits are negative, firm i will prefer to stay inactive. But we have 
not analyzed what will happen then. We put the existence conditions of a SNE in 
terms of parameter values n(.) and m, but that we did not talk about exit/entry of 
firms. The reason is that this doesn’t seem to make much sense in a static model and 
an analysis that does not go beyond symmetric equilibria. Moreover, even if V; > 0 
the possibility exists that ex-post, actual profits of firm i are negative. Hence, in a 
dynamic model also problems as bankruptcy would enter the scene.
Appendix A: Stochastic Demand
Proof proposition 3.1: Suppose that firm i has sent s, signals, and consider just one 
of those signals. Firm i sends this signal at random into the population. (Technically, 
suppose firm i has put all agents in an urn, draws just one agent to determine the 
destination of the signal, and replaces that agent). The probability that this signal 
from firm i is received by an interested consumer is n(p)/N. Each interested 
consumer puts all received signals in a um and draws just one signal out of his urn. 
Supposing that the signal from firm i is received by an agent who has in total 




























































































signal is 1/x. Thus, one has to determine x, the number of signals received by any 
given agent.
From the point of view of such an agent, the destination of each signal sent in the 
economy is the outcome of a Bernoulli trial with two possible outcomes: the signal 
will reach him or another agent. Thus, the number of signals received by any given 
agent has a binomial distribution with parameters the total number of signals sent 
and the probability of reaching this given agent. If the number of Bernoulli trials in 
the sequence is large and the probability of reaching the given agent is close to 0, 
the binomial distribution may be approximated by a Poisson distribution (see 
DeGroot [1986]). A glance at the appropriate probability tables suggests that such 
an approximation is reasonable when the number of trials is greater than 25, while 
the probability of success is smaller than 0.1. We assume that the sets B and D are 
such that both conditions will be fulfilled. Thus, the probability that this signal from 
firm i is received by an agent who has got (x-1) other signals is:
_i A.x_1Prob [x-1 other signals] = e~K ■ (x_ jy
where A = S/N is the expected number of signals received by any given agent 
with 1/N = Prob [‘hitting’ any given agent]
S = aggregate number of signals sent by all firms
Hence, the probability that any given signal from firm i will lead to an interested 
consumer visiting firm i is:
lx-t
Pr(s) = (n(p)/N) • I x“  (1/x) • e~x •
= (n(p)/N) ■ (1/A) ■ X x”  e~x • | r  



























































































= (n(p)/S) • (1 -  e-s/N) V i
This probability Pr(S) refers to one single signal sent. From the point of view of firm 
i, each signal it has sent is a Bernoulli trial with two possible outcomes: the receiver 
will visit firm i or not. The sum of a sequence of Sj of such Bernoulli trials is a 
random variable which has a binomial distribution with parameters s* and Pr(S). 
(Here we make a small error. That is, when a buyer has received more than one 
signal from firm i, he will perform only one Bernoulli trial.) If the number of signals 
is large while the probability that the receiver will visit firm i is close to 0, the 
number of buyers visiting firm i may be approximated by a Poisson distribution with 
parameter p, = p(s,, S_,) = s, • Pr(S) = (s,/S) ■ n(p) • (1 -  e-s/N) . As each visiting 
agents demands exactly one unit, the demand q, facing firm i has the same Poisson 
distribution: ffqjl p(s,, SJJ.D
Proof claim 3.1 a: p(s„ S J  = s, • Pr(S), with Pr(S) = (n/S) • (1 -  e_s/N) and 
S = ^ + Sj => Ap(s,, S_,)/As, = Pr(S) + s, • APr(S)/As,
The last term of the right-hand side of this equation is the indirect effect of sending 
one additional signal by firm i. This indirect effect is negative as APr(S)/AS| = 
-(n/S2) • {1 -  e-s/N • (1 + S/N)} < 0. That is, each signal sent becomes a little bit 
less likely to be successful when an additional signal competes with it. However, as 
long as S is relatively large, this indirect effect is negligible from the point of view 
of firm i: lim APr(S)/As, = 0.S—»oo
The direct effect is the probability that any given signal sent will lead to its receiver 
visiting the sender of the signal. As all probabilities: 0 < Pr(S) < 1.





























































































lim p(s„ S_j) = lim {Sj • n • (1 -  e (S' S ^ N)}/(s, + S_,) = °°/°°
Sj—+°° S;—
Applying L’Hôpital’s Rule gives:
,• f / i  - ( ï  + SJ/N - ( s ^ S J /Nlim n • {(l -  e ) + s/(N • e )} = n • (l + °°/°°)
Sj—
Applying L’Hopital’s Rule once again for the last quotient leads to:
lim p(Si, S_j) = n • (l + lim e fS| + S~ ^  ) = n □
S,— Sj — »oo
b: Ap(Sj, S_j)/AS_i = APr(S)/AS_j . As S = s* + S_{ , APr(S)/AS_, 
= APr(S)/As, < 0 (see above).
lim p(si; S_j) = lim s,/(s, +S_,) • n • (l -  e (s‘ + SJ/N) = 0 □
S, — Sj —
Proof claim 3.2: jl(s) = n/m ■ (l -  e ms/N). To get p.(0) and lim p.(s) just
S—t°°
substitute s.
Afl(s)/As = (n/N) • e"mVN => 0 < A|ü(s)/As < l 
A ^sj/A s2 = -(n • m/N2) • e 'm5/N < 0 □
Appendix B: Optimization
Proof claim 3.3 a: We rewrite R^z,, s,, S_,) by omitting subscripts and arguments as 
much as possible for notational convenience, and observing that
q • f[ql = Xq=, q ■ ^  ■ ÜL = n • L q=, tr*  •
q! (q-1)!
= P ■ X £ j tr* ■ —  = P ‘ F [z-1] 
y!




























































































AR,/As, = p • {Apj/ASj • F[z-1] + (0.,- AF[z,-l J/Ap,- Ap/As*
-  z,- AF[z,]/Ap,- Ap/AsJ
Now, AF[z]/Ap = F[z—1] -  F[z] = -f[z] and Ap/As = Pr (see claim 3.1).
Hence, AR/ASj = p • {F[Zj—1 ] -  p( • f[z -l]  + zt- f[z;]} • Pr 
As f[z—1 ] = (z/p) • f[z], we get AR/As, = p • F[z-1] • Pr. O 
b: Again, we first rewrite R^z*, s,, S_,).
R = P • { I qz,o q • f[q] + z • (1 -  F[z])}
Summing up the first term by parts and rewriting the second term gives 
R = P • {z • F[z] -  I J J  F[q] + z -  z • F[z]}
= P ' (z -  I S  Ffq]}
Then, AR/AZ; = p {1 -  F[zJ} □
Proof claim 3.4 a: The FOC is: AR,(Zj, s*, S_i)/As, = AK(si)/Asi. In case of
symmetry, z, = z, Sj = s and S_; = (m-1) • s for all i. Hence, we get ARj(z, s)/ASi =
AK(s)/As, =4> p • F[z-1] • Pr(s) = k. First, we keep constant z. If s = 0 then p(s) =
0 and hence F[z-1] = 1 for all z > 1. lim Pr(s) = lim n/(m • s) • (1 -  e_ms/N) =
slO sJO
0/0. Applying L’Hopital’s Rule gives: lim (n/N) • e-m's/N = n/N.
slO
Hence, AR,(z, s=0)/ASj = p • n/N for all z.
A{ARi(z, s)/As,)/As = p • {AF[z-l]/Ap • Ap/As • Pr(s) + F[z-1] • APr(s)/As} < 0 
as the only negative terms are AF[z-l]/Ap and APr(s)/As (see claims 3.1 and 3.3). 
lim Pr(s) = lim n/(m • s) • (1 -  e-ms/N) = 0.
S—»°° S—f®°
Hence, lim ARj(z, s)/As, = lim p • F[z-1] ■ Pr(s) = 0.
S— S—+°°
Now, we consider the variable z. ARj(z=0, s)/As, = 0,




























































































We can draw this in figure B.l. We see that for given z there is an optimal value 
of s: s(z), with s(0) = 0, As(z)/Az > 0 and lim s(z) = sm“  = {s: p • Pr(s) = k}. We
Z—fOO
see that if p • n/N < k then s(z) =0 for all z.
fig. B.l FOC+ with respect to signaling
Finally, we have to prove that s(z) > z for all z if s(z) < sm“ . Suppose s < sm“  and 
z > s. If z > s then F[z-1] = 1, as no firm can get more customers than the number 
of signals it has sent. Hence, AR,(z, s)/As, = p • Pr(s). We know that if s < sm“  then 
p • Pr(s) > k =4 if z > s then AR^z, s)/As, > k. Hence, for each given value of z, it 
will be profitable for each firm i to increase s, with one unit as long as s < sm“  and 
s < z. Therefore, s(z) > z for each z □
b: The FOC is: AR^Zj, s,, S_,)/Az, = ACXz /̂Az,. With symmetry we get ARL(z, 
s)/Az; = AC(z)/AZ| =4 p • (1 -  F[z]) = AC(z)/Az,. First, we keep constant s. If z = 




























































































A{AR|(z, s)/AZi}/Az= -p  • f[z+l] < 0 
lim AR,(z, s)/Az, = lim p • (1 -  F[z]) = 0.
Z—*°o Z—♦«>
Now, we consider the variable s. AR,(z, s=0)/Az; = 0 as (1(0) = 0, and hence F[z] = 
1. A{AR,(z, s)/Az,)/As = p • f[z] ■ Pr(s) > 0 and lim AR;(z, s)/Azj =
S—f°o
p • (1 -  F[zl p=n/m]) as |1(°°) = n/m (see claim 3.2).
The only assumption made with respect to AC(z)/Az is that it is strictly positive. As, 
at this point, there is no reason to impose a particular shape of the AC(z)/Az curve, 
in figure B.2 we just draw one possibility, chosen for expositional convenience.
fig. B.2 FOC+ with respect to production
maxWe see that there is a function z(s), with z(0) = 0, Az(s)/As > 0 and lim z(s) = z'
S i°o




























































































To prove that z(s) < s, suppose z = s. Clearly, F[z=s] = 1. Hence, AR1(z=s, s)/Az, = 
0 < AC(z)/AZj.
zm“ is given by the intersection of the AR,(z, s=“ )/Az; and the ACUj/Az, curve. 
Hence, if A2C/Az2 > 0 then one should have AR(z=0, s=°°)/Azi > AC(0)/AZj, which 
gives p • (1 -  e_n/m) > AC(0)/AZi or n/m > —In {1 -  (AC(0)/Az,)/p}. □
Proof claim 3.5: The SOC for t being the optimal strategy for firm i is:
A2Vi(zi, Si, S_i)/Az2 • A2Vi(Zi, 5,, S_j)/As2 -  { A f A ^ ,  s., S_i)/ASi}/Az,}2 > 0 
and A2Vi(Zj, s*, S_,)/As2 < 0
For notational convenience we omit subscripts and arguments as much as possible. 
A2V/Az2 = p • {(1 -  F[z+1]) -  (1 -  F[z])} -  A2C/Az2 
= -p  ■ f[z+l] -  A2C/Az2
A2V/As2 = p • Pr ■ AF|z-l ]/Ap • Ap/As -  A2K/As2 
= -p  Pr f[z-l] < 0  
A(AV/As)/Az = p • Pr • f[z]
Thus, the remaining condition to check is:
{-p ■ f[z+l] -  A2C/Az2} • {-p • Pr • f[z-l]} -  (p • Pr • f[z]} > 0 
=4 (A2C/Az2)/p > -  f[z+l] + (f[z])2/f[z-l]
=> (A2C/Az2)/p > -  f[z+l] + {f[z+l] • (z+l)/p}2/(f[z+ lj • (z/p) ■ (z+l)/p}
=> (A2C/Az2)/p>  f[z+l]/z □
Proof claim 3.6 a: d(AVi/ASj)/dk < 0 (see figure B.l) => if k decreases then the 
value of s for which the first FOC is satisfied increases for each value of z => the 
s(z) curve in figure 3.2 moves to the right. Moreover J im  s(z) = « . Hence, for some




























































































b: d(AVj/AZj)/d(AC/Az) < 0 (see figure B.2) =4 if AC/Az decreases then the
value of z for which the second FOC is satisfied increases for each value of s =*
the z(s) curve in figure 3.2 moves upwards. Moreover lim z(s) = Hence, for
AC/AziO
some r > 0 the s(z) and z(s) curves must intersect when AC(z)/Az < r for all z. O
Proof claim 3.7 a: d(AV/ASj)/dp = d(p • Pr • F[z-l])/dp 
= Pr ■ F[z-1] + p • dPr/dn • dn/dp • F[z-1]
+ p ■ Pr • dF[z-l)/dp • dp/dPr ■ dPr/dn • dn/dp 
= Pr • F[z—1 ] + p • Pr/n • dn/dp • {F[z—1] - p • f[z—1)}
=> d(AVj/ASj)/dp > 0 if dn/dp • p/n ■ {F[z-1] -  p • f[z-l)) > -F[z-1]
=> if {F[z—1] -  p • f[z—1 )} > 0 this yields the condition 
e < F[z-l]/{F[z-l] -  p • f[z-l)}, while 
if {F[z—1] -  p • f[z-l)} < 0 we get the condition 
e > F[z-l]/{F[z-l]V  p • f[z-l)}, which is satisfied for any e > 0.
Hence the s(z) curve may move leftwards or rightwards depending upon these 
conditions, which not only concern the price-elasticity of the demand but also z and 
p. □
b: d(AV/Az,)/dp = d{p • (1 -  F[z])}/dp
= 1 -  F[z] + p • -dF[z]/dp • dp/dn • dn/dp 
= 1 -  F[z] + p • f[z] • p/n • dn/dp 
=> dfAVyAZjVdp > 0 if dn/dp • p/n > (-1 + F[z])/(p • f[z])
=» if e < (1 -  F[z])/(p ■ f[z]) then d(AV/Az,)/dp > 0





























































































Proof claim 3.8 a: d(AV1/As,)/d(n/m)
= p ■ {dPr/d(n/m) • F[z-1] + Pr • dF(z-l ]/dp • dp/dPr ■ dPr/d(n/m)}
= p • dPr/d(n/m) • {F[z-1] -  p • f[z-l]}
The term between brackets may be positive or negative depending upon z and p, 
while the rest is positive. Hence the s(z) curve may move leftwards or rightwards 
depending upon z and p. □
b: diAV/Az^/dfn/m) = -p  • dF[z]/dp • dp/d(n/m)
= p ■ f[z] • dp/d(n/m) > 0
=> the z(s) curve moves upwards towards the 45” line. □
Proof claim 3.9: lim Pr(s) = lim n/(m • s) • (l-e-ms/N) = 1
n / m — *o° n /m — »°°
That is, each signal sent will surely lead to a consumer visiting its sender => q = s. 
We know x = min{q, z) => x = min{s, z). Cost minimization requires s = z. Hence 
the firm’s payoff V = p • z -  C(z) -  k • z => FOC: AV/Az=0 => z(s) = {z: p -  k 
= AC(z)/Az) □
Proof claim 3.10: According to the Envelop Theorem we only have to consider the 
direct effects of changes in the parameters (because AV/As, = AV/Az, = 0). 
a: dV/dk = -dK(s)/dk = -s  < 0 □ 
b: dV/d(AC/Az) = -dC(z)/d(AC/Az) = -z  < 0 □
c: Rewrite V = p ■ {p • F[z-1] + z • (1 -  F[z])} -  C(z) -  K(s) (see claim
3.3).
dV/dp = p • F[z-1] + z • (1 -  F[z]) + dV/dp • dp/dn • dn/dp 
= p • F[z-1] + z • (1 -  F[z]) + p • F[z—1 ] • p/n • dn/dp 




























































































=> dV/dp > 0 if e < 1 + {z • (1 -  F[z])}/(p • F[z-1) □
d: dV/dfn/m) = p • {F[z-1] + p • dF[z-l]/dp -  z • dF[z]/dp) • dp/d(n/m) 
= p • F[z-1] • dp/d(n/m) (see claim 3.3). 
dp/d(n/m) > 0 and hence dV/d(n/m) > 0  □
Appendix C: Characterization of a SNE
Proof proposition 3.4: The numbers of agents in the economy influence the 
economic environment through the stochastic distribution of signals and the 
stochastic demand directed to any firm. The first can be characterized by the 
parameter of a Poisson distribution X, with X = S/N is the expected number of 
signals received by any given agent. In case of symmetry we get X = (m/N) • s. 
The stochastic demand directed to any firm is characterized by a Poisson distribution 
with parameter p = (s/S) • n • (1 -  e_s/N), which gives in case of symmetry 
p = (n/m) • (1 -  e_(,n/N)*).
Substitute m = a m, n = a-n and N = a-N, and observe that both X and p remain 
the same. Hence, for both consumers and firms nothing changes. □
Proof proposition 3.6: Firm i’s effective supply z* is determined by the intersection 
of the s(z) and the z(s) curve. These two curves are defined by equation [3.2], As 
we see in claim 3.3, one of the arguments of these equations is F[z], This is the 
cumulative Poisson distribution function of the stochastic demand directed to firm 
i. Its expected value is p, and one of the parameters of p is the number of interested 




























































































Proof proposition 3.7: The case of a firm i is already considered in the text:
Prob [(Xj-Zj) > 0] > 0. Here we derive the probability that an interested consumer 
j (i.e. Zj > 0) is rationed. In a SNE the probability for a buyer to be rationed because 
of lack of communication is e~\ where X = m-s/N. 0 < e-* < 1 for X > 0. If, 
instead, an interested consumer j receives one or more signals, he randomly chooses 
one firm to visit. This firm’s supply is z. As customers are served on a first-come 
first-served basis, the probability to obtain its demand, then, is the probability to be 
among the first z customers in this firm’s ‘queue’, every place being equally 
probable. The number of visitors for a firm is represented by a Poisson distribution 
with parameter p: f[q]. When we approximate the number of ‘rival’ customers 
visiting this firm by the same Poisson distribution, the probability that a buyer j, 
having received at least one signal, will be in the position to buy one unit is:
Prob [early enough] = F[z—1] + X“=z [f[q] • z/(q+l)}
= F[z—1 ] + z/p • l ; =2+1 f[q]
= F[z-1] + z/p • (1 -  F[z])
Thus, the probability that any given buyer j will not succeed in finding one unit in 
the period under consideration and will be rationed is:
Prob [(xj~Zj) < 0] = 1 -  (1 -  e~x) ■ {F[z-1] + z/p • (1 -  F[z])} > 0
(This equation can be made more transparent:
Prob [(Xj—Zj) < 0] = 1 -  (1 -  e~x) • 1/p • (p ■ F[z-1] + z ■ (1 -  F[z])}
= 1 -  (1 -  e"x) • l/{(n/m) • (1 -  e^)} • Ex
= 1 -  (m • Ex)/n , where m • Ex = expected aggregate sales




























































































Drawing i from B  and j from D independently, we get Prob [(x-z,) • (xj-Zj) < 0] > 
0 for each pair i e B, j e D and zi > 0. □
Proof proposition 3.8: Just as in the non-cooperative case, the optimal strategy is 
the solution of a system of two equations. But now the FOCs have to be taken not 
only with respect to firm i’s own strategy t , , but also with respect to the strategies 
of the other firms t_, , because a change in t, implies a simultaneous, equivalent 
change in t , . Thus, a SCE is a solution to the following system of two equations: 
AVj/As, + AV/As_, = 0 
AV/AZj + AV;/Az_, = 0
From equation [3.2] we see that z_, doesn’t enter firm i’s payoff, i.e. AV/Az_, = 0. 
Hence, the second of the FOCs doesn’t change and the z(s) curve in figure 3.2 
remains the same.
Turning to the FOC with respect to signaling, we see that 
AR/As_, = p ■ Ap/As,, • F[z-1] -  z • AF[z]/A|i, • Ap,/As_,
= p • Am/As., • {F[z—1] + z • f[z]} < 0 because Ap/As_, < 0 (see claim
3.1).
That is, an increase in the signaling activity by each of the other firms (s_,) implies 
a decrease in the expected number of visitors for firm i |i.(S;, S_,). Hence, the 
revenue for firm i of sending one additional signal will be lower when also all other 
firms simultaneously send one additional signal, than in the case where firm i had 
to take the strategies of the other firms as given. Thus, the AR/As curves will be 
below the AR/As, curves in figure B.l, and for every value of z the value of s for 
which this FOC is satisfied will be lower, i.e. the new s(z) curve will be at the left 
of the s(z) curve in figure 3.2. As a result the intersection of the s(z) and z(s) curves 




























































































That Ve > V* follows from definition 3.3 and the fact that tc * t \  □
Proof proposition 3.9: Prob [cons, rationed] = 1 -  (m • Ex)/n, where 
Ex = p • F[z-1] + z • (1 -  F[z])
AEx/As = Ap/As • F[z-1] + p • AF[z-l]/Ap • Ap/As -  z • AF[z]/Ap • Ap/As 
= Ap/As • F[z—1 ]
Ap/As > 0 (see claim 3.2) => AEx/As > 0 => AProb [cons. rationed]/As < 0 => as s 
decreases the Prob [cons, rationed] increases.
Next, we consider the effect of the change in z. Ex = z -  X Ji F[q] (see claim 3.3). 
=> AEx/Az = 1 -  F[z] > 0 => as z decreases the Prob [cons, rationed] increases. 
□
Proof claim of note 18: Suppose agent j has sent signals to or received signals from 
r agents [1, .., r) and define their aggregate effective demand resp. supply:
Z; = X'=, max(zh 0) resp. Z; = X[=1 min(Zj, 0) , and their aggregate actual purchases 
resp. sales: X* = X'=1 max(Xj, 0) resp. X; = X'=1 min(xi, 0) . Then (Z; -  x,) > 0 
implies (Z; -  X;) = 0 and (Zj -  x,) < 0 implies (Z* -  X*) = 0 
In words, if agent j is rationed in his demand (supply) then among the agents with 
whom he is in the market, i.e. among the agents with whom he has direct contact, 
there will be no agent with an unsatisfied supply (demand) for that commodity. If 
agent j is a consumer and his shopping activity is only bounded by his own desire 
for the commodity and his knowledge of the firms, he will continue to search for a 
unit of the commodity either until he has found it or until he is sure that no firm 




























































































some units left at the end of the period, necessarily all consumers who know about 
him must have fulfilled their demand.
In a more general setting with more commodities, apparently a problem might arise 
if an agent would not be able to fulfil his demand not because of lack of trading 
partners, but because of lack of liquidity. Two assumptions serve to rule out this 
possibility. The first is that each agent formulates his effective demands at the 
beginning of each period subject to the restriction to meet his budget constraint with 
probability 1. This is a standard assumption in stochastic rationing models (see e.g. 
Green [1980]). The second assumption concerns the status of the effective demands 
which each agent has to take into account when deciding at the beginning of the 
period. We assume that if an agent meets trading partners and hasn’t yet realized his 
whole effective demand, he will fulfil his effective demand as far as possible given 
the demand of his trading partners. Such an assumption, which in fact says that 
agents do not make new decisions during a basic period, is standard in a 
conceptually properly defined period model.
Appendix D: Numerical Analysis
We analyze numerically for which parameter values the FOC+s and SOC for 
maximization of firm i’s payoff are fulfilled, with V, > 0, when firm i chooses 
a strategy t* given that all other firms choose the same strategy t*. The parameters 
are k, p, N, m and those concerning the functions n(.) and C(.).
For matters of convenience of the presentation, in the numerical analysis we restrict 




























































































origin, and hence A2C(z)/Az2 = c , with c > 0 (see corollary 3.1). We normalize p=l 
and fix N = 100,000. So, the parameters to consider are k, c, n and m.
In figure 3.3.a we consider the importance of the numbers of firms (m) and 
interested consumers (n), fixing k and c. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
marginal costs of signaling k are a relatively small fraction of the price p. For 
example, sending a letter won’t cost much more than a stamp, and other means of 
signaling might be even cheaper. We fix k = 0.01 and c = 0.001. As the marginal 
cost of production is c z, the value of c chosen implies that a firm will never 
produce more than 1,000 units.
In figure 3.3.b the role of the values of the cost parameters k and c is considered, 
fixing the parameters m = 100 and n = 10,000. We put m relatively small to n in 
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In figure 3.3.a the linearity of the boundary is prominent. Except for very small or 
very large values of n, a SNE exists, given the other parameters, as long as n/m > 
50. That is, on average there should be at least 50 interested consumers per firm in 
the population, which does not necessarily mean that firms should actually get this 
number of clients.
In figure 3.3.b we used a somewhat unconventional scale on the vertical axis for 
expositional reasons. Clearly, k should be smaller than .10 for a SNE to exist as 
(n/N)p = .10 (see proposition 3.2). Essentially there are two reasons why a SNE 
does not exist for some parameter values. For combinations of c and k below the 
shaded area a SNE doesn’t exist because the SOC is not fulfilled (remember c = 
A2C/Az2). For values above the shaded area the FOC or the condition V>0 are not 
satisfied.
Appendix E: Notation
A set of all agents
B set of firms
C(z) production function
D set of consumers
Ah(x) h(x+Ax) -  h(x)
e price-elasticity of demand
flql Pi p.d.f. of q with parameter g
F[z]
k ‘marginal’ cost of signaling
K(s) signaling function
X expected number of signals received by any given agent
m number of firms
Pi expected demand directed to firm i




























































































N number of agents in the economy
® i endowments agent i
P price of the commodity
P i threshold price of consumer i
Pr probability that any given signal leads to a consumer visiting its sender
9i demand directed towards firm i
RiO gross revenue firm i
s. number of signals sent by firm i
S-, aggregate number of signals sent by all other firms
s aggregate number of signals sent by all firms
t‘ SNE strategy t
tc SCE strategy t
t strategy t for which the FOC-plus-symmetry-conditions are satisfied
t, * (Z j,  s>) strategy of firm i
t 3 (z, s) complete vector of strategies of all firms
t_i * (z_i, S_i) vector of strategies of all other firms
X time-index
U,(.) utility function consumer i
v,(.) payoff to firm i
*i actual transactions by firm i
X*H aggregate actual purchases (sales)
Z j output or effective supply of firm i
z+(_) aggregate demand (supply)
Notes
1 For the literature about the informational efficiency of allocation mechanisms we refer 
to Calsamiglia [1987]).
2' Besides this the auctioneer must, of course, check that the rules of the game are 
respected. Thus e.g. trades must be such that each individual’s budget constraint is obeyed.




























































































having troubled two non-smokers vainly for a light, might hesitate before troubling the next 
passer-by, and will probably wait until he perceives someone smoking.
4 Cf. Gilles & Ruys [1988] who take the exactly opposite approach, assuming a situation 
of complete information of each agent with respect to the deterministic relational structure 
of the economy.
5- We differ e.g. from the so-called ‘t-wise optimality’ literature. Goldman & Starr (1982), 
generalizing results of Rader (1968) and Feldman (1973), show that if there are some 
traders who deal in all commodities at least in small quantities or if there is one good 
which everyone values and possesses in positive amounts, t-wise optimality implies Pareto 
optimality. This is a property of the final allocation and does not go into details concerning 
the trade process by which it may be achieved. Feldman (1973) did give such a possible 
process: an infinitely rotating sequence of bilateral trades. Every agent is supposed to act 
directly (although sequentially) with all other agents, and the accounts are made up only 
after an infinite sequence. In fact, Feldman assumes that transaction costs are zero in case 
of bilateral trade. While it seems reasonable to assume that trade between only two agents 
does not involve transaction costs, it seems much less plausible that the formation of an 
infinite number of trading pairs itself is a costless affair.
6 Note that the signals give no information about the size of the effective demands, and 
that this corresponds to what we usually observe in reality. A reason might be the 
following. Stating an effective demand creates in a certain sense a commitment, but if the 
nth agent arrives and reminds agent i of such a commitment agent i might assert that he has 
fulfilled already part of his commitment. As this is difficult to check and may lead to 
confusion, agent i will prefer to state only the size of the remaining demand directly to the 
nth agent when he arrives. Note also that in discrete-time models agents make their 
effective demand decisions only at the beginning of each period (see section 3.3), i.e. they 
don’t deviate from these by making new decisions during the period, even when they have 
not publicly announced their effective demand decisions.
7' To assume that consumers may make only one visit and that the order in which they 
make their visit is random is convenient for presentational reasons, it does not restrict the 
nature of the problem of the firm in any sense; it only changes the value of some of its 
parameters, it is just a simplified version of the following scenario which would apply 
when one would consider more commodities and more visits.
Assume that the economic environment of each agent is such that his transaction attempts 
cannot take place continuously but only at discrete times, and that individual actions are 
discrete but not synchronized among agents. A method of modeling transaction attempts 
would be to let time flow continuously and to view the visits and exchanges as discrete 
events of zero duration like the arrivals in a Poisson process (see Foley [1975] or Diamond 
[1982]). An operational counterpart to solve problems like order of visits and simultaneity 




























































































Associating with each agent a ‘random clock’ which rings, independently for each agent, 
at the instances of a Poisson process, an agent may do a transaction attempt when his clock 
rings. As long as the length of a period x isn’t infinite compared with the parameter of the 
Poisson process of the ‘random clock’, each consumer will be able to make only a limited 
number of visits in each period.
8 In this sense we differ from Ioannides [1990] who also analyses communication by 
individual agents in order to make markets, and then considers multilateral trade between 
all agents who are, directly or indirectly, informationally linked.
9 What we mean by ‘randomly’ in a strictly technical sense is explained in appendix A. 
Conceptually, we don’t want to exclude the possibility that agents make their choices in 
a deterministic manner. However, as they do not have any relevant information on which 
to base their choice, and as we don’t have any insights which irrelevant criteria they might 
apply, we may very well consider their choices to be random.
10 Thus, in our model there is no need to distinguish the threshold price (the price above 
which a consumer does not buy) from the so-called reservation price as it is known from 
the search-literature. The latter is the price below which you do immediately buy and stop 
searching. This is not a purely individual characteristic, but depends upon the market 
situation. More specifically, it will depend upon the assumed trading structure of the 
economy and upon the strategies chosen by the other agents.
11 See note 9.
12' To lighten notational burden somewhat, we will usually write n instead of n(p).
13 Allowing for more visits per buyer would just give a higher value for the parameter p.
14 In this sense we differ e.g. from the literature on stochastic rationing (e.g. Green [1980]) 
where it is directly assumed that each agent’s trading possibilities are a stochastic function 
only of his own demand and the aggregate demand and supply in the economy. We also 
differ from the literature on completely random matching models (e.g. Gale [1985]) where 
an agent’s trading opportunities are independent from his own decisions, and we differ 
from the fix-price literature in general where the sending of effective demands is the only 
means of communication (cf. Drazen’s [1980] criticism).
15 For reasons of expositional convenience we will obscure somewhat the fact that the 
variables z and s are discrete. Hence, considering unit increments of these variables, the 
FOCs are:
AV^z,, Si, SJ/Asj > 0 while AV^, Si+As, S_,)/As, < 0 




























































































This is also important with respect to the existence of a SNE, which usually doesn’t exist 
in cases of pure strategies in a discrete choice problem. In fact, we suppose that these 
variables will assume large values such that they are approximately continuous.
16 Anticipating a result of the analysis, we avoid here to give a rather cumbersome 
analogous expression for the case in which A^fzVAz2 < 0.
17' An additional condition is that the parameters remain such as to allow for the Poisson 
approximations.
18 Allowing for more visits per buyer would not change the picture. Each buyer unsatisfied 
in his first round might be more successful in his second or third round. As a result, given 
the level of signaling s, the probability of rationing will be lower for both firms and buyers. 
But only if consumers could visit all firms they know, individual markets would be orderly 
(a proof of this claim can be found in appendix C). Note, however, that still, at the 
aggregate level the economy would not be orderly, and both firms and consumers might 
rationed at the same time.
19 In this respect the model differs from some other models with stochastic rationing (e.g. 
Weinrich [1984]), where it is usually assumed that markets are orderly, implicitly assuming 
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